Are Poland and Ukraine Gravity Centres for Each Other? Study on the Labour Migration Patterns by Sokołowicz, Mariusz & Lishchynskyy, Ihor
Comparative Economic Research, Volume 21, Number 1, 2018
10.2478/cer–2018–0003
MARIUSZ E. SOKOŁOWICZ*, IHOR LISHCHYNSKYY**
Are Poland and Ukraine Gravity Centres for Each Other?  
Study on the Labour Migration Patterns
Abstract
The question of migration within the European Union, as well as between its 
member and non‑members states, has become recently an important issue. Among 
the EU and OECD countries, Poland is not a major recipient of immigrants. How‑
ever, in recent years one can observe a growing number of both permanent and 
temporary immigrants, most of whom are Ukrainian citizens, whose main depar‑
ture motive is work. 
The main purpose of the paper is to conduct a comparison of the migration 
patterns for Poland and Ukraine, as well as survey the mutual causation forces 
that determine the structure of the Ukraine‑Poland migration corridor.
The paper consists of three parts. It starts with an introduction followed, 
by theoretical backgrounds of migration, outlining its main types and models. The 
next parts highlight the volume, directions and structure of migration flows for 
Ukraine and Poland. The evolution of the Ukraine‑Poland migration channel and 
its mutual effect on the economies of both countries is highlighted in the final part.
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1. Introduction
The simultaneous growth of internationalization and divergences in the global so‑
ciety, as well as the re‑division of the geopolitical map, has led to an increasing 
number of international migrants. In recent years, migration has become an ever 
more worldwide and urban phenomena. According to the Migration Report of the 
UN DESA (2016), there were an estimated 244 million international migrants 
in 2015 (for comparison that figure was 173 million in 2000) and 740 million in‑
ternal migrants (UNDP 2009) in the world. 
Recent years are highlighted by the post‑crisis renewal of the advanced econ‑
omies, accompanied with stagnation in numerous less developed countries, the 
sparking of military conflicts, and strengthening of contrasts and contradictions 
between global players. These forces shift the vectors and intensity of migration 
flows worldwide. Both Ukraine and Poland have been directly or indirectly in‑
volved in the above‑mentioned phenomena.
Ukraine, being a battlefield at the fringes of the western and orthodox civ‑
ilisations, has become a growing source of cheap labour for Europe. Since the 
start of military conflict in 2014 visits by Ukrainians to Russia have decreased 
by one‑third, according to (IOM 2016a). Poland, among the EU and OECD coun‑
tries, is not a major recipient of immigrants overall. However, in recent years 
we can observe a growing number of both permanent and temporary immigrants, 
most of whom are Ukrainian citizens, who declare work as their main departure 
motive. This is beneficial for the Polish economy, which is experiencing an out‑
flow of workers to the EU–15 countries, as well as ageing and depopulation re‑
sulting from negative natural growth. The following parts of our paper present 
existing patterns of these flows as well as offer basic predictions for the future 
in this field.
The main purpose of the paper is to conduct a comparison of migration pat‑
terns for Poland and Ukraine, as well as survey the mutually causation forces that 
determine the ‘shape’ of the Ukraine‑Poland migration corridor.
This introduction is followed by the theoretical backgrounds of migration, 
outlining its main types and models. The next sections highlight the volume, di‑
rections and structure of migration flows for Ukraine and Poland. The evolution 
of the Ukraine‑Poland migration channel, and its mutual effect on the economy 
of both countries, is highlighted in the final section. 
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2. Theoretical backgrounds
In contemporary definitions, migration is interpreted as a form of mobility. The lat‑
ter can be divided into job mobility or a geographical mobility (Grabowska‑Lusińs‑
ka 2012, p. 58). Job mobility appears both in the case of changing the employer 
as well as changing the employee situation (e.g. becoming unemployed, or finding 
a job after a period of unemployment) as well as in cases of work promotion or deg‑
radation, with the consequence of changing one’s social and material status. Geo‑
graphical mobility involves permanent or temporary movements due to a variety 
of reasons. In cases of geographical mobility, the reason for migration can be clas‑
sified as either compulsory or voluntary, while from the point of view of the aims 
of migration, one can distinguish mainly educational, religious, ecological, polit‑
ical, patriotic and economic reasons (Kawczyńska‑Butrym 2009, pp. 16–24).
What’s more, migration seems to be essentially an urban affair. About 50 per 
cent of international migrants reside in ten highly urbanized, high‑income coun‑
tries, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, several countries in Eu‑
rope (France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom), the Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Migrants in fact tend to concentrate 
in the cities of these countries (International Organization for Migration 2015, 
p. 2). Such large scale migration processes affect every continent and both the de‑
veloped and developing world. Recent trends also reveal that migrants are increas‑
ingly differentiated in terms of age, educational achievements and sex (in fact, 
more and more migration studies point out the feminization of migration trends). 
Moreover, non‑permanent forms of migration are also becoming more and more 
popular. Owing to the international integration taking place in many parts of the 
world (especially in the European Union) and the related removal of legal barriers 
on labour markets that, periodic, seasonal and circular forms of migration are also 
becoming more and more common. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable 
in the case of trans‑border migration, where the Polish‑Ukrainian border is a vis‑
ible example.
On the other hand, we observe also economic reasons as predominant force 
underlying migration in the world today, which is also connected with the grow‑
ing politicization of migration processes. International migration is increasingly 
affecting national policies, bilateral and regional relations, and influencing the do‑
mestic political discourse concerning public security policy (Klimek 2015, pp. 38–
39). This, together with the deepening cultural diversity of migrants (especially 
in Europe), determines the anticipated migration patterns (Castles and Miller 2011, 
pp. 364–366). Undoubtedly, migration in the coming years will strongly affect 
demographic changes (especially in the context of the ageing developed world). 
It will also increase the risk of tensions in the world, which is polarized from the 
developmental point of view. 
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Today, the decision to migrate is rarely a consequence of only one of the 
above‑mentioned factors. Contemporary concepts explaining the causes and direc‑
tions of migration take into account their complex composition. Modern economic 
literature distinguishes a dozen of models dedicated to the nature of migration.
The first group of models investigates the origin of migration. According to the 
neo‑classical approach, migration is determined by macro differences in labour 
demand and labour supply, resulting income divergences throughout regions and 
states (Harris and Todaro 1970; Schiff, 1994; Todaro and Maruszko 1987). The 
research based on the ‘push‑pull’ approach of Dorigo and Tobler (1983) empha‑
size the repulsive (push) factors in a domestic country and attractive forces (pull 
factors) in the potential host countries. 
The second group of models considers migration from the perspective of its 
spatial expansion and temporal duration. In this line, the ‘vital transition’ of Ze‑
linsky (1971) and ‘development tiers’ of Skeldon (1997) are usually mentioned, 
arguing that there is a long‑term dependence between migration, economic de‑
velopment, and state formation. The ‘migration hump’ approach considers the 
short‑term effect of trade reforms (Martin 1996) or FDI flows (Haas 2007) on mi‑
gration intensity.
The third, and pessimistic, type of models (the so‑called ‘dependency school’) 
with its roots in Marxist economics) includes the continuation of Wallerstein’s 
‘world‑systems’ (1980), or Piore’s ‘dual labour market’ (1969) approaches, accord‑
ing to which the capitalist system is draining the peripheries via migration.
The fourth group emphasizes social dimensions of migration. The ‘network 
migration’ approach explains the nature of subsequent facilitating by already set‑
tled migration channels via bonds of kinship, friendship, and common origin (Ap‑
pleyard 1992; Flores‑Yeffal 2012)1. The ‘new economics of migration’ postulates 
that households, but not individuals, are the main decision‑making forces of migra‑
tion, aimed at risk diversification in comparison with other households etc. (Stark 
and Bloom 1985). The ‘cumulative causation’ approach through network expan‑
sion also belong to this group (Fussell and Massey 2004; Massey et al. 1993).
A fifth group of models attempts to present a more complex vision. Among 
the approaches of this style, we could mention the ‘migration systems theory’ (van 
Dalen et al. 2005; Guarnizo et al. 2003) and the ‘synthetic theory of international 
migration’ (Massey 2015).
Almost all the above‑mentioned models could be used to some extent to ex‑
plain the migration processes in Ukraine and Poland. The neoclassical approach 
could be the most appropriate for explaining the launching of the process, however 
the ‘network migration’, ‘new economics of migration’ and ‘cumulative causation’ 
approaches explain its maintenance, continuing nature, and its encouragement. 
1 The pioneers of migration act as ‘bridgeheads’ until migration achieves a critical mass, after 
which restrictive ‘gatekeepers’ arise (Böcker 1994; De Haas 2003) 
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3. The patterns of migration in Ukraine
Exact official figures concerning migration flows in Ukraine are not available. The 
National Statistic Service of Ukraine provides data about numbers of outgoing 
visits abroad and incoming visits of foreigners. Figure 1 demonstrates that among 
the almost 25 million outgoing visits in 2016, more than 10 million were direct‑
ed to Poland.2 Following the start of the military conflict with Russia, the number 
of crossings of the Russian‑Ukrainian border by Ukrainians declined by more than 
37% (Ukrainian migration to Russia direction was in first place and exceeded that 
to Poland until 2013).
The graph of incoming visits into Ukraine had steep upward trend until 2008, 
and been followed by a slower but rising trend until 2013. The positive balance 
of migration was interrupted in 2014, when an almost 50% decrease of Russian 
incoming mobility can be observed.3 Mobility from Poland had decreased sharp‑
ly after its high point in 2008, when the number of visits had exceeded 5 million; 
in 2016 it Polish incomers to Ukraine totalled less than 1,2 million. The countries 
with the most numerous Ukraine visits in 2016 were Moldova (4.3 million), Bela‑
rus (1.8), Russia (1.4) and Hungary (1.2).
Figure 1. Incoming and outgoing mobility in Ukraine (cumulative diagram)4.
Source: compiled by authors using data from (Державна служба статистики України, 2017). 
2 65% of border crossing were generated by a 30 km border‑zone with a preferential regime 
of cross‑border mobility (Statistical Office in Rzeszov, 2014)
3 It should be noted that the statistics for this period do not include information for the Crimea 
and occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
4 The 2014–16 data for Crimea and the occupied territories are not included. The statistics 
do not include mobility of military and transport service staff.
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According to Eurostat 2017, the number of EU residence permits for Ukrainians 
is constantly increasing (see Figure 2). In 2015 the number of valid permits exceed‑
ed 1 million, and in addition more than 430,000 new permits were also granted. 
Poland had become the absolute leader according to this indicator, being respon‑
sible for 32% of all valid permits and 86% of new permits in 2015. 
But the abovementioned data do not reflect the situation with respect 
to labour migration. The information provided by National Migration Service 
of Ukraine (see Table 1) about the number of persons officially employed under 
a contract with foreign entities is far from depicting real state‑of‑the‑art. According 
to Міграційний Профіль України 2011–2015 2016, in 2015 the number of persons 
who filed a report on labour mobility was 76,884. It should be noted that such 
off‑shore centres as Cyprus, Marshall island, and Liberia are among the leading 
countries which hire Ukrainian labour force. De facto, this is an illustration of the 
tax‑avoiding practices of Ukrainian business entities, which register their facilities 
in such “safe harbours”
Figure 2. Number of residence permits for Ukrainian citizens in the EU (cumulative diagram)5
Source: compiled by authors using data from (Eurostat, 2017).
The number of EU Blue Card holders is even less among Ukrainians, but 
it is increasing annually (see Table 1). The largest issuers of Blue Cards for Ukrain‑
ians in 2015 were Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Latvia 
(Eurostat 2017). 
Several attempts had been made to calculate the real numbers of labour mi‑
gration from Ukraine. According to the estimation of Malynovska (2006), 2–3 mil‑
5 Eurostat collects data on first permits granted to third‑country nationals during the reference 
year and data on permits valid at the end of the reference period.
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lion Ukrainian citizens are working abroad, while Markov et al. (2009) indicated 
4.5 million workers, of whom about 1,7 reside in the EU. 
As indicated by Vollmer (2016), migration figures are inaccurate because 
of the great number of circular migrations. The vast amount of petty trading via 
pendulum local border traffic,6 as well as ‘shuttle trading’,7 should be treated rath‑
er as a specific economic activity, but not as a type of labour migration. Besides, 
the temporality of migration processes in Ukraine should be taken into account. 
For instance, Ukrainian‑Russian labour migration varies from 1 to 3 million de‑
pending on the season; the same tendency can be observed with respect to EU 
countries.
Table 1. Official outgoing labour migration from Ukraine
Countries 
of the 
employ‑ment
Applicants of the labour 
mobility reports (thousands 
of persons)
Countries 
of the 
employ‑ment
EU Blue Cards’ holders 
(persons)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cyprus 21.0 20.1 17.5 15.9 15.7 Germany 109 468 608 848
UK 5.0 8.4 10.1 10.3 9.8 Poland 0 6 21 272
Germany 4.1 6.6 9.5 7.9 8.4 Czech Republic 11 16 25 57
Greece 9.3 8.7 7.9 6.5 6.2 Lithuania n/a 4 31 54
Marshall island 1.3 3.0 2.6 4.5 3.0 Latvia 6 6 20 49
Poland 3.1 2.7 2.2 3.5 6.2 Bulgaria 0 0 7 36
Netherland 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.6 Romania 0 1 20 30
USA 4.1 5.7 4.3 2.9 2.9 France 2 4 6 23
Liberia 9.0 4.0 2.4 2.5 2.3 Austria 15 14 20 13
Other 23.35 24.9 31.0 21.2 20.0 Other 6 17 18 46
TOTAL 82.4 86.7 83.4 78.0 76.9 TOTAL 149 536 782 1428
Source: Compiled by authors using data from Міграційний Профіль України 2011–2015 2016, 
(Eurostat, 2017)
The first complex survey was conducted in 2009 by the Ukrainian Centre of Social 
Reforms, together with the Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics (Чебанова 2009). 
A sociological questionnaire encompassed 4,100 members of the working age popula‑
tion for the period 2005–2008. According to the survey’s results, during the researched 
period there were about 1.5 million labour emigrants from 1.2 million households (5.1% 
6 30–50 km zones at the borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary with preferential cross‑bor‑
der mobility regimes
7 1–3‑day business trips aimed at purchasing small quantities of goods in China, Poland, Tur‑
key etc., with the aim of selling them in Ukraine and vice versa. This was a typical survival strategy 
for a lot of Ukrainians in the 1990s under the conditions of high unemployment and wage delays. 
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of the working‑age population). The patterns of emigration were: 67% males; 54.5% 
of urban origin; 31.2% persons with higher education.8 More than half (57.4%) of all la‑
bour emigrants were from Western Ukraine, 18.8% from Eastern Ukraine, 9.2% from 
the Centre, 8.9% from the South and 5.7% from the North. The geography of emigration 
was: Russia (48.1%), Italy (13.4%), the Czech Republic (11.9%), and Poland (8.0%).
The second (and most recent up until now) national survey was conducted 
in 2012 by the Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics (Міграційний Профіль 
України 2011–2015 2016). According to the report, around 1.2 million Ukrainian 
citizens were working abroad during the researched period (7.2% of the potential 
labour force9). The migrant pattern was estimated as follows: 75% males;10 54.3% 
of rural origin; 45.9% persons with higher education; 63.8% were employed at en‑
terprises; 29.3% in households. The geography of emigration was: Russia (43.2%), 
Poland (14.3%), Italy (13.2%), the Czech Republic (12.9%).
According to estimations of International Organization for Migration (2016b), 
for the period of 2014–2015 the number of Ukrainian labour emigrants was around 
688,000, besides approximately 310,000 who registered an intent to migrate in the 
nearest 12 months. The geographical pattern of long‑term and short‑term migrants 
is not unified. The most visited countries for long‑term emigration were Poland 
(22.8%), Russia (19%), the Czech Republic (18.3%) and Belarus (2.5%). The des‑
tinations of short‑term migrants were: Russia (46.8%), Poland (17.3%), the Czech 
Republic (9.6%), Belarus (4.5%), and Italy (3.7%) (IOM, 2016a). 
According to the stylized facts presented by Klimek (2015, p. 49) the average 
Ukrainian migrant was a 35‑year‑old male; an urban resident who graduated from 
high school; going abroad relatively often (twice up to five times every two years), 
usually for a short period of time (2–3 months). He was a qualified worker, work‑
ing in the construction sector in Russia, who found a job through his own network 
of family or friends. This man earned 817 USD monthly, worked more than 40 
hours weekly, and spent up to 25% of his budget on living costs.
However, all the above investigations are far from adequately representing the 
real situation with respect to migration. In Poland alone the number of Ukrainian 
workers exceeded 1 million in 2016 (see more details in the following paragraphs). 
In any case, the number of Ukrainians searching for employment abroad 
is rather vast. It is not surprising that Ukraine is often called ‘Europe’s Mexico’ 
(Düvell 2007). According to the United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division (2016), in 2015 the number of Ukrainian mi‑
grants abroad comprised more than 6 million persons (ranking 7th in the world).11 
8 Or some level of higher education.
9 The intensity of emigration process varied among the territory: in Western Ukraine – 10.8% 
of regional working‑age population (70% of all emigrants), in Southern Ukraine – 1.9%, 
North – 1.3%, East – above 1% and Centre – less than 1%
10 But the share of women migrants to Italy was 78.5%, to Hungary – 53.0%
11 In 2000 the diaspora rank was 5th, with the same number of migrants.
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The Russia‑Ukraine and Ukraine‑Russia vectors of migration were among the 
most popular (3rd and 4th ranking of the most intensive migration corridors) after 
Mexico‑USA, and India‑UAE. 
4. The migration patterns from Ukraine to Poland
The picture concerning Ukrainian migration patterns in Poland is blurred. This 
is a result of discrepancies between various sources of statistical information, 
which in turn is a consequence of the complexity of the migration phenomenon. 
For example, the Polish Central Statistical Office concentrates primarily on perma‑
nent migration, while Eurostat attempts to also capture periodic migration. Neither 
sources of information distinguish between labour and other types of migration, 
while the Polish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy concentrates only 
on economic migration.
Despite these methodological difficulties, we are able to observe that Poland 
is a very modest international migration hosting country. In 2015, immigration 
to Poland, according to Eurostat data, totalled 218,100 persons. This however 
is a noticeable growth when compared to 2006 (Figure 3). However, when com‑
pared to OECD data on migration inflows into the European Union, this is still 
a small share. According to OECD (2016, p. 291), the total number of immigrants 
into the EU was over 2.1 million).
Figure 3. Migration inflows and outflows in Poland 2006–2015
Source: Compiled by authors using data from (Eurostat, 2017).
54 Mariusz E. Sokołowicz, Ihor Lishchynskyy
We can also observe that migration outflows from Poland (558,837 in 2015, 
according to Eurostat), exceeds migration inflows and this is a long‑term trend 
(Figure 3). We consider this as particularly disturbing in terms of the anticipated 
demographic trends in Poland. According to demographic forecasts, the number 
of inhabitants of Poland is going to decline by more than 25%, from 37.9 million 
in 2020 to 29.0 million in 2080 (Eurostat 2017). This prognosis of decline is consid‑
ered to be one of the highest in the European Union, where the population in 2080 
is expected to remain at a similar level to that in 2020. Meanwhile, in Poland the 
current migration trends do not allow us to assume that an influx of new residents 
from other countries will help balance the demographic gap.
In fact, Poland in one of the European countries where the number of im‑
migrants per 1000 inhabitants is relatively low. In 2014 it stood at 5.8, compared 
to 13.6 in Austria, 13.1 in Sweden, 10.9 in Germany or 9.8 in United Kingdom (Eu‑
rostat 2017). However, lower numbers can be observed, among others, in France 
(5.1), Italy (4.6), the Czech Republic (2.8) and Slovakia (1.0), in comparison to the 
EU average of 3.8 (Eurostat 2017).
In the nationality structure of permanent migrants to Poland, Ukrainian citi‑
zens significantly dominate. Taking into account all migration reasons (economic, 
political, educational, etc.) the share of Ukrainian immigrants was 25% on average 
in the years 2007–2014. It is worth observing that at the same time the immigra‑
tion from Germany was at 7%, while from Viet Nam and Belarus it was 6%, 5% 
for Spain, 4% for the Russian Federation, and 3% for China and Turkey (OECD 
2016, p. 291).
Table 2. Inflows of the top 10 nationalities to Poland as a % of total inflows of foreigners
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2004–13 annual average 25 7 6 3 6 4 3 5 2 2
2014 24 6 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 3
Source: (OECD, 2016: 291).
Taking into account economic immigrants, the official statistics are compiled 
by the Polish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy. According to this data, 
the number of immigrants obtaining legal work permits has grown noticeably from 
18,000 in 2008 to 127,400 in 2016. At the same time, we can observe a large growth 
in the number of immigrants employed on the basis of so‑called ‘employers’ official 
claims’. The latter are dedicated, according to Polish regulations, to the citizens 
of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia, and relate to occu‑
pations in which there is a deficit of the Polish labour supply. In case of both forms 
of employment, we observe a significant dominance of Ukrainian citizens.
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Table 3. Economic immigrants in Poland in between 2008 and 2016
Work permits Employers’ claims
2008 2011 2016 2007–2010 2011 2016
Poland 18,022 40,808 127,394 Poland 180,073 163,984 1,314,127
Ukraine 5400 18669 106223 Ukraine 169490 153779 1262845
Belarus 1325 1725 4870 Belarus 3623 2078 23400
Moldova 1218 1017 2844 Moldova 5912 6540 20650
India 733 1055 1772 Russia 595 505 3937
Nepal 181 1202 1211 Georgia 453 1082 1698
Other 9585 17140 10474 Armenia n/a n/a 1597
Source: Compiled by authors using data from Polish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy.
In 2016, labour immigrants in Poland obtained a total of 127,394 work permits, 
and another 1,314,127 were employed on ‘employers’ official claims’. We observe 
that 83% of all work permits went to Ukrainian citizens (Figure 4a). The other 
immigrants are. by country of origin, far less numerous. Among them are Bela‑
rus (4,900 permits), Moldova (2,800), India (1,800), Nepal (1,200), China (1,200) 
and Russia (1,000). With the other nationalities representing less than 1,000 per‑
mits from each country. When we analyse the structure of employer’s claims, the 
dominance of Ukrainian citizens is even more visible. Out of the 1,314,127 persons 
employed in this format, 96% come from Ukraine (Figure 4b). 
a) Work permits b) Employers’ claims
 
Figure 4. Economic immigrants in Poland in 2016
Source: Compiled by authors using data from Polish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy.
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5. The Ukraine‑Poland migration corridor and its economic consequences 
for both countries
As has been shown, during recent years Poland has become the most intensive 
gravity centre of migration for Ukrainians. After 2013, the number of visits to Po‑
land exceeds the incoming Ukrainian mobility to Russia. In 2016, the number 
of visits exceeds 10 million, 65% of which were generated by pendulum migra‑
tion in the 30‑km zone. 
As far as the migration is concerned, the evolution of its patterns from Ukraine 
to Poland can be divided, after Klimek (2015, pp. 52–73), into three periods:
1. 1991–1997 – a time of spontaneous and uncontrolled migration (no visa was 
needed), making it difficult to determine quantitatively ex‑post facto;
2. 1998–2005 – the time of introducing visas for Ukrainian citizens to the time 
of the introduction of regulations in Poland making legal work possible. This 
time period is characterized by a significant reduction in the spontaneous and 
uncontrolled influx of migrants from Ukraine
3. After 2006 – the time of a significant liberalization (especially in the early 
years of this period) of regulations relating to working without a permit, and 
a rapid increase in the number of migrants from Ukraine in Poland. 
The year of 2017 could be the beginning of a new period, taking into account 
the acceptance of a visa‑free regime for Ukrainians in the EU.
In general, it has been noted that the migration of Ukrainians to Poland can 
be presently explained mainly by the relative income differences. The tremendous in‑
crease in Ukrainian migration to Poland after 2013 can be explained by, first of all, the 
sharp deline in real wages in Ukraine connected with 300% devaluation of the national 
currency. According to UNECE (2017), in 2015 and 2016 gross average monthly wages 
in Ukraine were around USD 200,12 while in Poland this same indicator was around 
USD 1,000 (Figure 5). Such a large gap could not be levelled by the 50% higher con‑
sumer prices in Poland. The other already mentioned factors are the military conflict 
and institutional easing at the borders, and the labour market from the Polish side.
According to National Bank of Poland, the number of Ukrainian labour mo‑
bilities to Poland is constantly increasing: in 2014 Polish employers had submitted 
about 390,000 statements of intentions to employ foreigners and 370,000 of them 
concerned Ukrainians. In 2015 the figures were already 780,000 and 760,000 re‑
spectively (Chmielewska et al. 2017). The estimation for 2016 predicts that the num‑
ber of Ukrainian workers will exceed 1.3 million (Bartyzel 2017). The figures are 
extremly impressive, taking into account traditional Polish national homogeneity, 
but still it’s been remarked that they are not enough to compensate for the Polish 
labour outflow to ‘old Europe’ and simultaneous economic growth.
12 While in 2013 it comprised USD $400.
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Figure 5. Gross Average Monthly Wages in Poland and Ukraine, US$
Source: (UNECE 2017).
The pattern of Ukrainian migration to Poland has also changed after 2014. The 
earlier researches emphasized the circularity of Ukraine‑Poland migration13 (To‑
ruńczyk‑Ruiz 2014), but after 2014 the share of new migrants that had never been 
in Poland before increased dramatically (up to 42.3% of all Ukrainian immigrants 
to Poland) (Chmielewska et al. 2017). If until 2013 the share of immigrants from 
Western, Northern and Central Ukraine were 93.7%, now the ratio from Eastern 
and Southern Ukraine increased to 28.4%.
According to the stylized facts presented by Klimek (2015, p. 49) an average 
Ukrainian migrant in Poland is a female, from the Western part of the country, 
coming from a rural area, who finished a general high school. In Poland she is usu‑
ally employed in household service (including agricultural households), earning 
635 USD monthly, working more than 40 hours a week. and spending up to 25% 
of her budget on living costs.
However, other characteristics were also changed after the spark of military 
conflict in Ukraine. The share of men, who were in the minority before 2013, 
was increased from 33% to 58%. The immigrants became significantly young‑
er – the ratio of 18–35 years old increased from 29% to 65%. Sectors of employ‑
ment of Ukrainian immigrants have also shifted during recent years. A significant 
decline is observed in the sector of household services (from 51.3% to 18.3%), while 
the sector of renovation and construction has increased from 15.3% to 35.3%. Oth‑
er sectors with increased significance include retail and wholesale as well as hos‑
pitality and tourism (Chmielewska et al. 2017).
The structure of Ukrainian economic migration to Poland also varies by host 
regions. According to data from Polish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Pol‑
icy, in 2016 the sum of work permits and employers’ claims for Ukrainians was the 
highest in the capital region (Mazowieckie – 389,408), followed by Dolnośląskie 
13 Repeated movement of the same migrants between their home and destination countries.
58 Mariusz E. Sokołowicz, Ihor Lishchynskyy
(142,631) and Wielkopolskie (134,135), but also including Małopolskie (111,378), 
Łódzkie (100,696) and Śląskie (91,330). This picture clearly shows that the largest 
economic migration influx is to regions with the largest Polish cities as regional 
capitals (respectively to Warsaw, Wrocław, Poznań, Kraków, Łódź and Katowice). 
In other words, Ukrainian immigrants in Poland are attracted primarily to first 
and second‑rank Polish cities, and Ukrainian migration to Poland is (accordingly 
to OECD findings) an urban phenomenon. This opens the door for further research 
at the level of these cities, and as well constitutes a challenge not only for national but 
also for urban migration policy, which should be adapted to local specificities.
A specific and very significant type of migration from Ukraine is student mi‑
gration. According to the Central Statistical Office of Poland (2016), in 2015 the 
number of students from Ukraine was increased to 30 589 (53.5% of all foreign 
students in Poland). From the Ukrainian perspective, the number of students who 
select Poland, is 31.8% among all Ukrainians engaged in foreign studies (Russia, 
which ranks 2nd, accounts for only for 10.5%) (IOM, Mission in Ukraine 2016b). 
Half of Ukrainian students are active in the labour market and a third declare their 
desire to work in Poland after graduation (Chmielewska et al. 2017). 
The migration effect on the Ukrainian economy is hard to assess unambig‑
uously. The advantages and disadvantages of both emigration and immigration 
processes in Ukraine, as well as comparison with Polish analogues, are present‑
ed in Table 4.
From one perspective, large flows of emigrants should lower the pressure 
on local labour market. The statistical confirmation of this is firm at first glance: the 
official unemployment rate in Ukraine declined from 12.4% in 2000 to 9.7% in 2016 
(Державна служба статистики України, 2017). But these figures do not reflect 
the fact that, following the recent reduction in real wages, the number of self‑em‑
ployed or unofficially employed persons increased dramatically. 
The other less‑than‑obvious drawback of increased periodic migration is the 
unwillingness of residents to work in low‑paying positions upon their return 
to Ukraine (as well as their family members, who stayed in Ukraine, not having 
enough motivation to work at all). The most visible result of such practice is the 
deficit of labour supply for low‑paid and low‑skilled jobs, such as retail sellers 
or clerks. This effect is in line with the concept of the ‘new economics of migra‑
tion’ mentioned above. 
The most often declared disadvantage of emigration from Ukraine is the ‘brain 
drain’ phenomenon. According to Міграційний Профіль України 2011–2015 2016, 
45.9% of Ukrainian emigrants were persons with a higher education. The journal‑
ist’s survey (Хмельовська 2013) shows that 1,622 Ukrainian scientists left abroad 
for permanent residence between 1996 to 2011. Most of them emigrated to the Unit‑
ed States (420), Russia (388), Germany (251), Israel (117), Canada (109) and Poland 
(52). In 2007–2011, many doctors in Biology (56), Physics and Mathematics (38) 
and Medicine (30) left for abroad (Parkhomenko 2014).
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Table 4. Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of migration processes in Poland 
and Ukraine
Advantages/disadvantages Poland Ukraine
H
os
tin
g 
co
un
tr
y
Advantages
• Influx of workers in sector with labour supply shortages +++ +
• Lowering the costs of educating workers (they are educated in other 
countries)
++ +
• Reduction in labour costs + +
• Development of economic sectors and jobs associated with migration 
services 
++ ++
• Increased consumption in the host country ++ ++
• Growing demand for housing ++ ++
• Improving the demographic structure of the host country – –
• Enriching local culture ++ ++
Disadvantages
• Need to create an infrastructure for immigrant services (housing, 
health and social care, education)
– –
• Workplace shortages for the local population (which can give rise 
to aggression on the part of the local population)
– –
• Social tensions on the part of immigrants who feel “under‑citizens” –– ––
• Risk of crime in the host country – –
O
ri
gi
n 
co
un
tr
y
Advantages
• Reduction in the unemployment rate + +
• Inflow of consumer and investment capital as a result of transfer 
of emigrants’ earnings to their country of origin
+ +++
• Increased professional and social competence of migrants that can 
be used after their return to the home country
++ +++
• Development of economic sectors and jobs associated with migration + ++
• Increasing social mobility (both horizontal and vertical) ++ +++
• Objectivising the perception of one’s own country by becoming ac‑
quainted with the outside perspective
+ ++
Disadvantages
• Weakening the demographic potential and structure – –––
• “Brain drain”, leaving people less educated and less entrepreneurial 
in the origin country
––– –––
• The lack of care for the children of migrants (“care drainage”). ––– –––
• Weakening of local consumption and investment – economic degra‑
dation of areas depopulated by emigration)
– –
• Deficit of workers on the local labour market –– ––
• Transfer of retirement pensions – –
Source: Own study, based on the classification of Kawczyńska‑Butrym (2009, pp. 55–69).
Other disadvantages have a more social nature. These are weakening of the de‑
mographic structure and ‘care drain’. The effect of ‘Euro orphans’(Faist et al. 2013) 
in the case of emigration to Poland is not so strong (compared to situation with 
‘bad’ Ukrainian mothers in Italy), as it typically has a more seasonable nature.
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The main advantages of emigration are related with the acceleration effect 
caused by the transfer of earnings from abroad (in 2014–2015 according to Interna‑
tional Organization for Migration (IOM) the total transfers were estimated to be 2.8 
billion USD). This effect is especially visible in the western part of Ukraine, where 
capital originating from emigration plays a crucial role in the development of small 
business as well as in maintaining of consumer demand at a sustainable level. 
However, according to IOM (Mission in Ukraine 2016b), about 40% of the total 
amount of remittances of migrants in 2014 was spent on consumption; 20% were 
invested, primarily in the construction, purchase, or renovation of housing; 40% 
were saved (the main purposes of savings were the purchase of real estate, durable 
goods and childrens’ education). Besides, arranging the emigration process in itself 
becomes a good business – numerous companies could be considered as ‘bridge‑
heads’ of migration. The ‘gatekeeper’ effect is currently not very strong in the case 
of Poland (but we can’t say the same for the Italy). Another advantage is the in‑
creased professional and social competence of migrants, which can be used after 
their return to Ukraine (probably the most obvious effect of this is observed in the 
field of construction).
The process of migration into Ukraine is also rather hard to assess with re‑
spect to the economy of Ukraine. UN DESA (2016) indicates the number of im‑
migrants in 2015 to be of around 4.8 million (13th rank in the world, 11% of the 
population). Such large figures are connected with the common USSR past of the 
residents – most of the immigrants are Russians (67%) and other CIS citizens main‑
ly in the Eastern part of the country. The figures of IOM are more moderate and 
probably closer to reality. According to the IOM Mission in Ukraine (2016a), the 
number of immigrants in Ukraine (i.e. foreign nationals residing based on perma‑
nent residence permits) is 250,000 persons, or slightly more than half a per cent 
of the population. Immigrant workers are mainly executives and managers (63% 
in 2015), engaged in the wholesale and retail trade (23%) and processing indus‑
try (17%). 
Thus, the influence of immigrants on the employment rate and wage level 
is rather low. However, rather often immigrants create new industries and launch 
new product markets on the territory of Ukraine. Other benefits are increasing 
domestic consumption and enrichment of the local culture. The main disadvan‑
tages are the sharpening of Ukraine‑Russia tensions and the promotion of sepa‑
ratism in regions with a high density of Russian residents, as well as organized 
crime activities, predominately of Caucasian origin (there is lack of precise re‑
search in this field).
Poland, contrary to Ukraine, has little significance on the European and glob‑
al migration map. Nevertheless, we observe a significant increase in the influx 
of migrants to Poland, especially from Ukraine. We claim that the continuous 
improvement of the economic situation in Poland has accelerated the Ukraine’s 
desire to join the European Union, as well as has opened an important migration 
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corridor from Ukraine. For years Ukraine has been the leading country among mi‑
grants in Poland, owing to its favourable geographic and cultural proximity, as well 
as by language skills. Migration is mainly driven by unfavourable economic sit‑
uation of Ukraine and large differences in income and purchasing power. These 
phenomena exacerbated in the years of economic crisis and were fostered by the 
war in Ukraine. It is estimated that one third of Ukrainian migrants originate from 
regions of armed conflict. We may also surmise that an improvement of the po‑
litical situation in Ukraine and adoption of pro‑European path in economic poli‑
cy will bring back a convergence of income and reduce migration pressure.
Today, we can particularly observe a significant increase in labour migration. 
This is possible, among other things, as an effect of the moderately pro‑immigra‑
tion policy of the Polish authorities. Because this policy is directed mainly to the 
citizens of the former USSR, the influx of these citizens is particularly noticeable. 
Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of migration processes, we can assert 
that the balance is in favour of both countries (Table 4). However, benefits outweigh 
the disadvantages primarily in those aspects that can be felt in a relatively short 
period of time. Among them we mention the positive impact on the labour market 
situation in both countries, cost reductions, increased consumption, and the devel‑
opment of economic sectors and jobs associated with migration services. On the 
other hand, in observing the contemporary migration patterns between Ukraine 
and Poland we cannot say that that influx of Ukrainian immigrants to Poland can 
significantly improve the demographic situation in the country. This is particularly 
disturbing in the context of the key demographic problem of both countries – rap‑
idly aging societies. It seems that both countries need both the coordination of mi‑
gration policies and the long‑term planning of their activities in this field. 
6. Conclusions
International migration has become of crucial importance in the current globalized 
world. More than 3% of the global population is living in the countries other than 
their country of origin. Both Ukraine and Poland are actively involved in interna‑
tional mobility processes; moreover, together they form a powerful migration corri‑
dor that has a good chance to be included in the world top–10 list if the trends con‑
tinue in the nearest future (according to some estimations it is already there).
Economic decline and political tensions in Ukraine have spark emigration 
from Ukraine to a level unseen before. The military conflict has shifted the main 
vector of mobility from the Russian to the Polish direction, and has changed the 
gender and age pattern of the emigrants (young males prevail). The qualitative 
survey indicates that the economic advantages of emigration are of greater impor‑
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tance for Ukraine, while the disadvantages are mostly of a social nature and are 
not so severe in the case of moving to Poland as compared to other EU states.
On the other hand, Poland has been experiencing economic growth and cur‑
rently is experiencing a lack of labour supply, which was eroded by previous emi‑
gration flows from Poland and its demographic decline. In such conditions Poland 
became an intensive centripetal gravity centre for Ukrainians. The higher relative 
income and available workplaces are powerful ‘pull‑factors’, while cultural and 
language proximity of both countries makes the cost of adaptation of Ukrainian 
citizens to the Polish labour market relatively small.
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Streszczenie
CZY POLSKA I UKRAINA TO NATURALNE CENTRA 
PRZEPŁYWÓW MIGRACYJNYCH?  
STUDIUM ZJAWISKA MIGRACJI ZAROBKOWYCH  
I JEGO KLUCZOWYCH ATRYBUTÓW
Problematyka migracji w ramach Unii Europejskiej oraz pomiędzy UE a krajami trzecimi 
stała się w ostatnich latach istotnym zagadnieniem. Choć Polska nie należy do czołówki 
krajów przyjmujących imigrantów zagranicznych, w ostatnich latach zaobserwowano 
niezwykle dynamiczny przyrost ich liczby, szczególnie z Ukrainy. Głównym motywem 
migracji obywateli ukraińskich do Polski jest przy tym motyw ekonomiczny.
Celem artykułu jest porównanie wzorców ukraińskich obserwowanych zarówno 
w Polsce jak i Ukrainie, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem przepływów między tymi dwoma 
krajami. Pozwala to na identyfikacje kluczowych czynników,, które determinują strukturę 
korytarza migracyjnego pomiędzy Polską a Ukrainą.
Artykuł składa się z trzech części,. Rozpoczyna go wprowadzenie wraz z przeglądem 
teorii wyjaśniających główne typy, motywy i modele migracji międzynarodowych. Kolejna 
część stanowi charakterystykę skali, kierunków oraz struktur przepływów migracyjnych 
pomiędzy Ukrainą a Polską. Opis ewolucji przepływów migracyjnych w ostatnich latach 
oraz jej wpływ na gospodarki obydwu krajów został zaproponowany w ostatniej części 
opracowania.
Słowa kluczowe: migracje, mobilność zawodowa, mobilność geograficzna, Polska, 
Ukraina
